The Sensibilities of Our Forefathers
The History of Sodomy Laws in the United States
By George Painter
© Copyright, George Painter 1991-2002
Washington
"[Spokane] will become a city of sodomy."
The Post-Revolution Period, 1776-1873
The organic act for the Washington Territory1
adopted all laws of Oregon extant as of March 2, 1853, the date of the organic
law. Fortunately for Washingtonians, Oregon did not have a sodomy law on the
books on this date, but did several months afterwards. As a result, sodomy was
legal in Washington.
Period Summary: Washington had the good fortune of being created
as a territory when it was, because only a year later, its history would
have been different. At its creation, it received the laws of Oregon.
Early in 1853, Oregon was without a sodomy law, but enacted one toward the
end of the year.
The Victorian Morality Period, 1873-1948
I. Sodomy
Although there was no sodomy law, in 1875 a vagrancy statute was enacted.2
Included in the definition were any "disorderly persons,"3
a convenient catchall that could have been used in lieu of a sodomy law.
This situation did not change until the adoption of a new code in 18814
that recognized common-law crimes.5
In its first constitution from 1889, Washington pioneered the right to
privacy by enacting a completely worthless provision reading
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.6
As written, any statute, enacted for any purpose whatever, can be used to
override privacy rights.
In the first reported sodomy case in the state, State v. Place,7
from 1893, the Washington Supreme Court held an information for an assault to
commit sodomy under the common-law section to be valid. However, the Court
overturned the conviction because of a trial error regarding the jury.8
The Washington legislature panicked as a result of Place, because
the Court had noted the absence of a sodomy law. Just 19 days after the
decision was announced, a sodomy statute was enacted9
that adopted the common-law definition of the crime and established a penalty
of 10-14 years in prison.10 An emergency clause
was included because "there is not now any statute of this state
providing for the punishment of the crime against nature[.]"11
In the 1899 case of State v. Romans,12
the Washington Supreme Court sustained an information saying that Romans
committed an "assault upon a male person and, against the order of
nature, had a venereal affair with and carnally knew such male person" to
be sufficient.13
In a comprehensive criminal code revision in 1909,14
a crime was defined as "an act or omission forbidden by law,"15
which may have been considered an abrogation of common-law crimes. The sodomy
law was amended to include use of the "mouth or tongue,"16
and lower the penalty to a maximum of 10 years.17
Another provision prohibited the "detailed account" in newspapers of
the commission or attempted commission of the crime of rape, carnal
knowledge, seduction, adultery, sodomy or any other sexual crime, or of
the trial of any person charged therewith[.]18
Another section in the new code expanded the vagrancy law19
to include "[l]ewd, disorderly or dissolute person[s]."20
In 1911, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court, deciding State v.
McDowell,21 upheld a conviction for assault
with intent to commit sodomy. Rejected as errors in the trial were the state
requirement that all jurors be taxpayers, thus authorizing a biased jury,22
and leading questions asked of the alleged victim.23
Also in 1911, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, decided State
v. Douglass.24 The Court unanimously
sustained a sodomy conviction even though the complaining witness made
"an exaggerated statement as to the number of times a certain thing had
been done" and then admitted that it wasn’t true.25
In a third case from 1911, State v. Harsted,26
a Department of the Washington Supreme Court upheld a sodomy conviction even
though the complaining witness, an 11-year-old boy, reportedly had syphilis of
the mouth, but the defendant did not have syphilis. The defendant wanted this
evidence admitted to prove the immorality of the boy, but the trial court
refused, and the Supreme Court upheld the ruling.27
In the 1914 case of State v. George,28
the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously overturned a
conviction for an "attempt" to commit sodomy, deciding that this did
not constitute an "assault" to commit the act.29
The Washington Supreme Court, in the 1921 case of State v. Demas,30
prohibited the introduction into evidence of alleged acts of
"immorality" by the complaining witness. Solely because Demas tried
to prove "individual acts of immorality," rather than the witness’s
"reputation," the Court ruled that the trial judge properly barred
the questioning.31 The witness, Milton Draper,
allegedly had
been found in the commission of immoral acts while attending the school
under * * * especially the class of Mr. Duskin, and that he exhibited an
immoral character.32
In 1922, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, ruled in State
v. Psaras33 that sodomy convictions could
be secured based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.34
In 1927, in a non-sodomy case, State v. Wray,35
a Department of the Washington Supreme Court overturned the George
precedent that an "attempt" did not necessarily constitute an
"assault" to commit sodomy. Wray, accused of attempted larceny,
relied on George to establish his defense, but the Court said that some
of the statements in that case
seem to be inconsistent with our holding in the present case, and in so
far as they are inconsistent they are overruled.36
In 1930, in State v. Bestolas et al.,37
a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld the consensual
sodomy conviction of one man, even though his partner in the same act was
acquitted. John Bestolas and Alfred Brewer were caught by private security
guards while engaging in fellatio in a railroad yard in Tacoma. They confessed
their guilt to the guards, but then denied the confessions and claimed that
they were obtained only under coercion.38 The
jury convicted Bestolas of sodomy, but acquitted Brewer, even though their
confessions were equal. Bestolas then contended that, since they were accused
of consensual activity with each other, Brewer’s acquittal required his. The
Court disagreed, saying, without explanation, that "the verdict of the
jury was amply warranted by the evidence."39
The next reported case was also one of consensual fellatio. In 1932, in State
v. Fry,40 the Washington Supreme Court,
sitting In Department, rejected the contention that the fellatee could not be
prosecuted under the wording of the 1909 sodomy law. The Court said that
"[t]he filthiness and proscription rests equally upon both."41
The man who allegedly fellated Fry denied on the stand that Fry had done the
same to him, apparently to protect him. However, he had earlier made an
affidavit admitting to the act, and this was admitted into evidence to
contradict his statement.42
In 1933, in State v. Chubb,43 a
Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed that sodomy
defendants could be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.44
In 1936, in State v. Oberg,45 the
Washington Supreme Court, In Department, upheld the introduction of evidence
concerning "indecent books and pictures" against a sodomy defendant.
Conceding that the trial record was "somewhat confusing,"46
the Court decided that the literature shown to the teenage males involved
were calculated to arouse lascivious thoughts on the part of those who
saw or read them, particularly those who were of an adolescent age, as
were the younger boys.47
Curiously, the older "boys" were above the age of adolescence.
In 1937, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court reversed a conviction
for attempted sodomy in State v. Ficklin.48
Lyle Ficklin had been convicted of the attempt on the following testimony of
the complaining witness:
We went to bed and Mr. Ficklin tried to take hold of my penis, and I
told him to cut it out and he didn’t, so I pushed him away[.]49
The Court felt that this was not supported by other evidence, and the count
could not stand.50
In 1938, in State v. Boyles,51 a
Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld a sodomy
conviction committed on a "boy" (who was old enough to be employed
by the defendant) who did not make a complaint until three months after the
fact, and continued to work for the defendant.52
The Court also discussed the acquittal of Boyles as to a charge against a
26-year-old "boy."53
In the 1944 case State v. Swane,54 a
Department of the Washington Supreme Court reversed a sodomy conviction
because the state was able to prove only an attempt.55
Justice John Robinson opened the opinion with the moralizing statement that
the
subject matter of this appeal is of such a disgusting nature that only
an irreducible minimum of the particulars will be recited in this opinion.56
Robinson also wrote the Court’s decision in the 1945 case State v.
Collier.57 The testimony of a minor male
was considered competent because he
recited prayers at his school; that he said his prayers at night, but
not every night; that he knew it was wrong to lie or steal; that the Bible
was about Jesus, and more to the same general effect.58
Another boy had been asked "What is the Bible?" and "Who is
God?" and his answers satisfied the Court that he was competent to
testify.59
Washington enacted a psychopathic offender law in 1947.60
Anyone convicted of sodomy as well as "any disorderly conduct involving a
sex offense" were subject to the law.61 To
be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any psychopathy proceeding
were "any and all properly certified judgments and sentences of prior
convictions of sex offenses[.]"62 If found
to be a "criminal sexual psychopath" and committed to prison, the
individual could be sent to a mental institution after completing the
prison term, if "found not to be safe at large[.]"63
Although either the prisoner or a psychiatrist could petition for release
based on recovery from the psychopathy, the petition was limited to once per
year.64
II. Sterilization
Another provision in the 1909 criminal code revision made Washington the
second state to adopt a sterilization law.65
The trial court was permitted to order sterilization for anyone "adjudged
to be an habitual criminal."66
The Washington Supreme Court was the first to deal with the
constitutionality of a sterilization law in the 1912 case State v. Feilen.67
In a decision glaringly out of kilter with the other decisions of the next
decade, a Department of the Court unanimously upheld the provision. The
heterosexual defendant was convicted of statutory rape and the Court, speaking
through Justice Herman Crow, said that statutory rape was
brutal, heinous, and revolting, and [a crime] for which, if the
Legislature so determined, the death penalty might be inflicted without
infringement of any constitutional justification.68
Thus, if death was constitutional, sterilization had to be as well.69
Peter Feilen duly was subjected to a vasectomy against his will, and he was
the only person sterilized under the 1909 law.70
He later was found to be innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned and
sterilized and was pardoned by the Governor, but nothing could restore his
procreative functions.71
A new sterilization law was enacted in 1921.72
Washington became another of the states to require quarterly reporting of
inmates of any state institutions who were "feeble minded, insane,
epileptic, habitual criminals, moral degenerates and sexual perverts" for
possible sterilization.73
Through the end of 1934, there were only 30 sterilizations under the broad
law. The legislature failed to appropriate money to enforce it, one reason for
the low number.74
Money later flowed, because the sterilization law had been used on 684
people by 1942.75 It was found unconstitutional
by the Washington Supreme Court in In Re Hendrickson76
that year. The Court, by a 4-3 vote, found that the provision allowing the
serving of notice on the insane and mentally retarded was insufficient, since
their mental condition did not allow them fully to understand the nature of
the notice.77 The dissenters agreed that the
law was unconstitutional as applied to the insane and mentally retarded, but
they did not believe that the whole law had to fall because of one bad
provision.78
Period Summary: Washington enacted a new criminal code in 1881
that, although silent on sodomy, recognized common-law crimes. A decade
later, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that this provision permitted
prosecution of an assault to commit the crime, but pointed out the lack of
a specific sodomy law. Reacting faster than any other legislature ever
did, a sodomy law was enacted just 19 days later. It used the common-law
definition, but was amended in 1909 specifically to include oral sex.
Sodomy convictions almost always were upheld by appellate courts.
Washington was one of the first states to enact a sterilization law, and
it was the first state (and only one through the early 1920s) to have the
constitutionality of its law upheld. Later, however, just three months
before the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to criminal sterilization, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed course and struck down its law on due
process grounds.
The Kinsey Period, 1948-1986
Washington revised its psychopathic offender law in 1949.79
This law undertook to protect some civil liberties that other states did not,
including Washington in its first law. First, anyone committed under the law
was guaranteed "humane care and treatment" and the right to "be
restored to a normal mental condition as rapidly as possible with an avoidance
of loss of civil rights when not necessary[.]"80
Also, anyone not acting in good faith in referring a person under the law
could be prosecuted criminally.81 The law
defined "sexual psychopaths" as people predisposed "to the
commission of sexual offenses, and in a degree constituting him a menace to
the health or safety of others,"82 a
condition not found in the original law. The law applied to minors as well as
to adults.83
In the 1949 case State v. Brown,84
the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously affirmed one
sodomy conviction of a man, while reversing another. His alibi against the
second count was of being out of town on the date of the alleged offense.
Brown provided canceled checks written in San Francisco the day before and the
day after the alleged offense in Spokane, but the prosecution contended that
he could have been in San Francisco, flown to Spokane for an act of sodomy,
and flown back to San Francisco the next day.85
The Court was not sympathetic, however, to the claim that Brown’s consenting
partner, Dale Williams, was not arrested also. Williams was given immunity in
exchange for testifying against Brown, and the prosecutor erroneously informed
the jury that Williams was immune as a matter of law.86
Also not considered prejudicial to Brown were statements to the jury that
"this [Spokane] will become a city of sodomy," that the defendant
was "a pervert," and that he "does not think like we do."87
The Court believed that, since Brown was guilty of sex perversion, referring
to him as a "pervert" or saying that he thought differently from
other people was not prejudicial.88 The Court
also was unsympathetic to the claim by Brown’s attorney that Dale Williams
testified only under threat of police prosecution.89
The psychopathic offender law was amended in 195190
to become more specific regarding the definition of sex offenders. Both sodomy
and "vagrancy involving immoral or sexual conduct" were now
triggering offenses, as was an attempt to commit either.91
The acts had to constitute "a menace to the health or safety of
others" in order to bring the offender under the law.92
The law also eliminated the civil liberties protections created in the
previous law.
In 1953, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously reversed
a sodomy conviction in the case of State v. Olsen.93
A man had been convicted for placing his mouth and tongue on a girl’s
vagina. The Court said that
either the male or female sexual organ must be involved before there
can be carnal knowing of one person by another within the purview of the
sodomy statute. The only sexual organ involved in this case is that of the
female. We cannot hold that a touching of that organ with the mouth or
tongue constitutes carnally knowing the female, since touching it with the
male sexual organ does not constitute carnal knowledge.94
The Court concluded that the tongue actually had to penetrate the female
organ in order to accomplish sodomy.95
In 1955, in State v. Charley,96 the
Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously overturned a
sodomy conviction. The Court acknowledged that, from the evidence, it was
"easy to infer that penetration was probably effected," but it also
was possible that only an attempt was made, or that "other sexual
misconduct" occurred.97
In the 1963 case State v. Ridley,98 a
Department of the Washington Supreme Court, with one member absent,
unanimously upheld the right of the prosecution to ask leading questions of
the defendant’s two stepsons, who were reluctant to testify against him. The
Court concluded that the questions were "justified under the
circumstances."99
A few months later, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
decided State v. Rose.100 The Court
divided 5-4 to reverse a sodomy conviction because the prosecution had, in
addressing the jury, referred to Rose as a "drunken homosexual."101
Writing for the dissenters, Chief Justice Ott complained that, in light of
the vile details of the act of sodomy by mouth being accomplished in
the presence of the officers, and the sordid evidence with relation
thereto, the descriptive adjective "drunken" could not have
prejudiced the defendant, or detracted in the slightest degree from the
repulsive, degrading, and obscene act which the jury found the defendant
had committed.102
Obviously, Ott and the other dissenters believed that an act of fellatio
was so repulsive in and of itself that no terminology describing it negatively
could affect the jurors’ fairness.
In the 1965 case of State v. Holbrook,103
the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously upheld the
sodomy conviction of a man over his argument that the prosecuting attorney’s
final argument to the jury constituted misconduct. The defendant curiously did
not provide the Court any copy of the statements, so it was unable to rule on
the point.104
The most important sodomy case from Washington was State v. Rhinehart,105
decided in 1967. Sitting In Department, the Washington Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of Keith Rhinehart and rejected the first privacy challenge to
the law. Rhinehart had picked up 16-year-old James Miller in Downtown Seattle
and asked him if he wanted to make money. Miller agreed and went with
Rhinehart to his apartment, voluntarily participating in sexual relations. The
Court, for some reason, noted that Rhinehart’s apartment contained
photographs of nude males, wood carvings, and a round bed.106
Rhinehart then dropped Miller off Downtown and gave him his phone number to
call when "he wanted to earn some more money."107
Miller was picked up by police a couple of days later on a prowling charge,
but was released without charges being pressed. For unstated reasons, the day
after his release, Miller went to the police to file a complaint against
Rhinehart.108 The Court rejected Rhinehart’s
request for a new trial on the basis of Miller’s recanting his trial
testimony109 as well as the testimony that he
possessed magazines with photos of nude males being prejudicial.110
The most important argument of Rhinehart’s that the Court rejected was that
the sodomy law was unconstitutional as an invasion of privacy. The Court
believed that there was
no merit to this contention. The legislature has, by this enactment,
considered the public interest served by it. The prohibition of the
statute is a proper exercise of the police power.111
Also rejected were a challenge on the ground of vagueness112
and the establishment of religion.113
Rhinehart challenged the law as "impos[ing] their ethics on others who
follow homosexual practices,"114 but the
Court said that it "found no merit in this contention," referring to
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding bans on polygamy and snake
handling over objections of religious minorities.115
Rhinehart also filed a federal habeas corpus petition. In 1969, in Rhinehart
v. Rhay,116 a Ninth Circuit panel
unanimously overturned a trial court’s dismissal of his petition. He had
claimed discriminatory enforcement of the law in cases of "private,
consensual incidents between sexually mature adults." The Court felt that
factual issues presented in the petition needed to be addressed by the trial
court and remanded the case.117 Nothing more
is known of the case.
Keith Rhinehart returned to court in 1970, again in federal court, putting
up an admirable fight from prison in Walla Walla against state regulation of
private sexual activity. In Rhinehart v. Rhay,118
he revealed that he refused to be docile and meekly accept his fate. He argued
that many of the letters he had sent to his attorney in Seattle had been
intercepted and held by prison authorities.119
Judge William Gray noted, without criticism, that prison regulations
prohibited mailing "complaints about institution personnel, inmates or
policies."120 Apparently inmates could
discuss only how happy they were to be in prison. Gray read the intercepted
letters and noted that Rhinehart, ironically, informed his attorney that
prisoners were engaging in sodomy freely while the state prosecuted those
doing the same thing outside the walls. Gray believed that these letters
"reveal a pathological fixation with the subject of sodomy."121
Gray also felt that it was "readily understandable" why the prison
authorities did not want the letters to reach the outside.122
Rhinehart noted in his letters that he had been placed in solitary confinement
for
having protested the policy of the prison that required each inmate to
have a conference with the Catholic chaplain, and by his insistence upon
referring to such chaplain as "Mr. McCabe" rather than
"Father McCabe."123
The claim was "frivolous," thought Gray, because Rhinehart
was a very antagonistic and uncooperative prisoner and that his
attitudes and expressions would have tried the patience of the most
understanding of prison officials. To whatever extent, if at all, the
plaintiff’s imprisonment in solitary confinement was for reasons other
than his refusal to work, it is evident that such punishment was minor and
stemmed from the plaintiff’s own conduct.124
The Court also rejected Rhinehart’s arguments that while in prison he was
given
unneeded sedatives and other medical treatment against his will, and
that this constitutes a violation of his civil rights. It is not the
responsibility of a federal court to second guess the medical diagnosis or
treatment prescribed by state prison officials.125
Keith Rhinehart was released from prison in 1972, having been let out 3½
years early due to accumulation of "good time" credit.126
In State v. Paradis,127 also from
1967, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
sodomy conviction of a man based entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of
teenage males who were willing accomplices.128
In 1972, two men were arrested at a skating rink in the Seattle area for
holding hands while skating. Upon their arrest, police argued among themselves
as to what law they would use to charge them, trying to find one that would
stand up in court. As a result of the arrest, a protest at the rink was
conducted by a number of same-sex couples holding hands.129
The last reported sodomy case in Washington was State v. Sawyer,130
from 1975, just four months before repeal of the sodomy law. The Court of
Appeals rejected Sawyer’s claim that fellatio was not made a crime by the
sodomy law, because it only referred to "carnal knowledge." Although
acknowledging that the precise challenge raised by Sawyer never had been
addressed by the Washington courts, the Court of Appeals noted that fellatio
convictions previously had been sustained, and rejected his claim.131
In 1975, the Washington legislature enacted two laws: a comprehensive
criminal code revision132 that repealed the
sodomy and vagrancy laws,133 and a sexual
assault law that established an age of consent of 16 for sexual conduct, and
14 for sexual contact.134 In addition,
prostitution between persons of the same sex was recognized135
and the crime of "communication with a minor for immoral purposes"
was created136 that apparently made it a crime
to engage in any kind of conversation about sex with a minor. The code also
recognized common-law crimes.137
The law banning newspaper publication of crimes of sodomy remained on the
books until 1982.138
Period Summary: Reacting to the anti-homosexual hysteria during
the McCarthy era, Washington revised its psychopathic offender law to
eliminate all of the civil liberties guarantees it had created. Sodomy
convictions continued generally to be upheld by courts, and an early
privacy argument was rejected by the Washington Supreme Court in 1967 and
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the decision. A new criminal code
in 1975 repealed the sodomy law, but retained common-law crimes. This new
code left a contradictory age of consent that remained uncorrected to the
end of the era.
The Post-Hardwick Period, 1986-Present
The disparity in the age of consent was not changed until 1988 when a new
law139 raised the age to 16 for sexual
contact.140
The Court of Appeals, deciding City of Tukwila v. Nalder141
in 1989, voted 2-1 to suppress a police officer’s eyewitness testimony.
Officer Chris Hurst entered a public restroom and, as he said he routinely
did, peered through cracks in closed stalls looking for "lewd
conduct." He also entered a neighboring stall and peered over the top and
found Nalder masturbating, then arrested him.142
The Court found Hurst’s actions "sufficiently offensive to the privacy
interests of citizens of this state to be deemed an unlawful search."143
In 1990, the Washington Court of Appeals, in Adult Entertainment Center,
Inc. et al. v. Pierce County et al.,144
unanimously upheld a county ordinance requiring doorless viewing booths in
adult theatres. The Washington Supreme Court refused to review the decision.145
Although the sodomy law was repealed, the common-law crime statute remains,
and case law in Washington is that repeal of a statute in derogation of the
common law revives the common-law provision on the subject,146
thus making anal sex indictable in the state.
Period Summary: Washington courts followed the national trend by
finding a privacy interest in sex in enclosed public restroom stalls, but
not in enclosed adult theatre booths. The age of consent was clarified
with the legislature choosing the higher age of the conflicting ones it
originally created in the 1975 criminal code revision. Despite repeal of
the sodomy law, Washington continues to recognize common-law crimes and
case law supporting the common-law reception statute show that a
prosecutor choosing to do so can bring charges against consensual anal sex
in the state.
Footnotes
1 10 Stat. 172, enacted Mar. 2, 1853.
2 Laws of Washington 1875, page 89,
"An Act Defining Vagrancy and Providing Remedy Against," enacted
Nov. 12, 1875.
3 Id. at 90, §1.
4 Code of Washington 1881, (Olympia:C.B.
Bagley, 1881), page 29, §1952, enacted Dec. 1, 1881.
5 Id. at 159, §782.
6
Washington Constitution, Art. 1, §7, adopted Oct. 1,
1889. Both because of the flimsiness of this provision and the repeal of
the Washington sodomy law, I have not analyzed case law under this
section. However, I was informed by Mr. Joseph C. Greene of Washington
that the provision has been interpreted much more broadly than the wording
would have a reader believe.
7 32 P. 736, decided Feb. 18, 1893.
8 Id. at 737.
9 Laws of Washington 1893, page
470, ch. CXXXIX, enacted Mar. 9, 1893, but not signed by the Governor. It
became effective Mar. 14, 1893 after Governor John Harte McGraw sent it to
the Secretary of State without his signature.
10 Id.
11 Id. §3.
12 57 P. 819, decided June 22, 1899.
13 Id. at 820.
14 Laws of Washington 1909, page
890, ch. 249, enacted Mar. 22, 1909.
15 Id. §1.
16 Id. at 950, §204.
17 Id.
18 Id. §209.
19 Id. at 1027, §436.
20 Id. at 1028, §7.
21 112 P. 521, decided Jan. 3, 1911.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 523.
24 118 P. 915, decided Nov. 27, 1911.
25 Id.
26 119 P. 24, decided Dec. 4, 1911.
27 Id. at 25.
28 140 P. 337, decided Apr. 27, 1914.
29 Id. at 338-339.
30 195 P. 1001, decided Feb. 23, 1921.
31 Id. at 1002.
32 Id.
33 208 P. 1094, decided Aug. 29, 1922.
34 Id.
35 253 P. 801, decided Mar. 7, 1927.
36 Id. at 802.
37 283 P. 687, decided Jan. 10, 1930.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 688.
40 13 P.2d 491, decided Aug. 17, 1932.
41 Id. at 492.
42 Id.
43 27 P.2d 689, decided Dec. 13, 1933.
44 Id.
45 60 P.2d 66, decided Aug. 21, 1936.
46 Id. at 68.
47 Id.
48 67 P.2d 897, decided Apr. 26, 1937.
49 Id. at 899.
50 Id.
51 82 P.2d 575, decided Sep. 6, 1938.
52 Id. at 577.
53 Id.
54 153 P.2d 311, decided Nov. 16, 1944.
55 Id. at 312.
56 Id. at 311.
57 162 P.2d 267, decided Sep. 22, 1945.
58 Id. at 272.
59 Id.
60 Laws of Washington 1947, page
1161, ch. 273, enacted Mar. 21, 1947, effective immediately.
61 Id. §1(b).
62 Id. at 1163, §(d).
63 Id. at 1164, §(g).
64 Id. at 1167, §(i).
65 Laws of Washington 1909, page
890, ch. 249, at 899, §35, enacted Mar. 22, 1909.
66 Id. This law was alleged by one
masculinist writer to have been "sneaked through" the
legislature and that the Governor of Washington was a "coward"
for being afraid to veto it. See The Patriarch, Sep. 14, 1912,
1:1.
67 126 P. 75, decided Sep. 3, 1912.
68 Id. at 76.
69 Id.
70 Harry Hamilton Laughlin, Eugenical
Sterilization in the United States, (Chicago:Psychopathic Laboratory
of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922), page 91.
71 Id. at 292.
72 Laws of Washington 1921, page
162, ch. 53, enacted Mar. 8, 1921.
73 Id. at 163, §1.
74 Abraham Myerson, et al., Eugenical
Sterilization: A Reorientation of the Problem, (New York:Macmillan,
1936), page 19.
75 Moya Woodside, Sterilization in
North Carolina: A Sociological and Psychological Study, (Chapel
Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1950), pages 194-195.
76 123 P.2d 322, decided Mar. 5, 1942.
77 Id. at 325.
78 Id. at 328.
79 Laws of Washington 1949, page
604, ch. 198, enacted Mar. 19, 1949.
80 Id. §1.
81 Id. §2.
82 Id. at 613-614, §25.
83 Id. at 622, §51.
84 213 P.2d 305, decided Dec. 31, 1949.
Rehearing denied Mar. 9, 1950.
85 Id. at 307.
86 Id. at 308.
87 Id. at 309.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 310.
90 Laws of Washington 1951, page
669, ch. 223, enacted Mar. 17, 1951.
91 Id. §2.
92 Id.
93 258 P.2d 810, decided June 23, 1953.
94 Id. at 811.
95 Id.
96 291 P.2d 672, decided Dec. 22, 1955.
97 Id. at 674.
98 378 P.2d 700, decided Feb. 14, 1963.
99 Id. at 702.
100 382 P.2d 513, decided June 13, 1963.
101 Id. at 515-516.
102 Id. at 518.
103 401 P.2d 971, decided May 13, 1965.
Rehearing denied July 7, 1965.
104 Id. at 973.
105 424 P.2d 906, decided Mar. 2, 1967.
Revised Mar. 8, 1967. Rehearing denied May 3, 1967. Cert. denied, 389 U.S.
832, decided Oct. 9, 1967.
106 424 P.2d, at 907.
107 Id. at 908.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 909.
112 Id. at 909-910.
113 Id. at 910.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 409 F.2d 208, decided Mar. 5, 1969.
As modified Mar. 27, 1969.
117 Id.
118 314 F.Supp. 81, decided May 27,
1970.
119 Id. at 82.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 83.
123 Id. at 84.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Correspondence from David Hastings,
Chief of Archives, Jan. 27, 1995.
127 434 P.2d 583, decided Nov. 22, 1967.
128 Id. at 583-584.
129 The Advocate, Vol. 85
(May 10, 1972), page 10.
130 532 P.2d 654, decided Feb. 21, 1975.
Review by the Washington Supreme Court denied May 20, 1975.
131 Id. at 655.
132 Laws of Washington 1975 1st Ex.
Sess., page 817, ch. 260, enacted June 27, 1975, effective July 1,
1976.
133 Id. at 863 (209) (sodomy); at
866 (226) (vagrancy).
134 Laws of Washington 1975 1st Ex.
Sess., page 172, ch. 14, enacted Apr. 28, 1975. See §9.
135 Ch. 260, at 857, §9A.88.050.
136 Id. §9A.88.020.
137 Id. at 823, §9A.04.060.
138 Laws of Washington 1982, page
756, ch. 184, enacted Apr. 1, 1982. The repeal of the law is found on page
759, §11.
139 Laws of Washington 1988, page
561, ch. 145, enacted Mar. 21, 1988, effective July 1, 1988.
140 Id. at 563, §8 and §9.
141 770 P.2d 670, decided Apr. 3, 1989.
142 Id. at 671-672.
143 Id. at 674.
144 788 P.2d 1102, decided Mar. 29,
1990.
145 796 P.2d 725, decided July 2, 1990.
146 State ex rel. National Bank of
Commerce of Seattle v. Frater, 140 P.2d 272, at 275, decided
July 19, 1943.
