Court Overstepped in Sodomy Ruling
Inquirer, July 10, 2003
P.O. Box 8263, Philadelphia, PA 19101
By Mona Charen (syndicated)
Anyone who rises to the Supreme Court knows that justices
are not supposed to impose their policy preferences. Not even the most
assertive judicial activist would proudly claim that title. Instead, he’ll
cloak his intentions under the dodge of “due process” or “privacy” or
“liberty.” Law clerks are employed to disguise bald judicial legislation
as disinterested jurisprudence.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the court’s majority relied on
everything but the actual words of the Constitution, citing even the European
Union for the proposition that homosexual unions are not to be criminalized.
Justice Clarence Thomas was succinct in dissent. He said
he found the Texas law criminalizing homosexual sodomy to be “silly” (the
term the court had used about Connecticut’s anti-contraceptive law in
Griswold v. Connecticut). “If I were a member of the Texas legislature, I
would vote to repeal it.”
But his duty, as he and (sadly) only one or two others on
the court understand it, is to “decide cases agreeably to the Constitution
and laws of the United States.”
Justice Antonin Scalia has come in for a good deal of
criticism for his scathing dissents. His detractors charge that ridiculing
one’s adversaries is no way to win friends and influence people. Perhaps.
But Scalia is never personal, and his wrath grows out of frustration for a
majority that consistently refuses to restrain its desire to become a
legislature—no, a super-legislature, since Supreme Court decisions on
constitutional questions cannot be overridden except by constitutional
Only 17 years ago, the Supreme Court held in Bowers v.
Hardwick that there was no “fundamental right” to homosexual sodomy and
that, accordingly, the state of Georgia was free to criminalize it. One cannot
emphasize enough that this was not an endorsement of such laws, merely a
statement of the fact that states have great latitude to legislate. Only when
a state inhibits the exercise of a “fundamental right” does the court
traditionally consider invalidating a state law.
In the years since Bowers was decided, has homosexual sex
suddenly become a fundamental right? The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy
declined to say so explicitly, relying instead on an “emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”
Had the court not placed its big fat foot in this arena,
legislatures could have done the necessary weighing and balancing of competing
values and interests among the people. It is legislatures, not courts, that
are best equipped to accommodate “emerging awarenesses.”
Perhaps we don’t want homosexuals branded as
lawbreakers when they engage in private acts at home, but (in my view) we
really don’t want to encourage such unions by permitting gay marriage. All
of this, as Scalia emphasizes, falls within the normal purview of a
legislature. But such distinctions may now be “unconstitutional” because
the court has thrown the mantle of “right to privacy” on all matters
relating to adult sexuality.
Kennedy was sentimental about gay sex, asserting that
“when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring.” This may or may not be the case, but from a legal point of view,
it pulls the supports out from under many prohibitions on sexual behavior.
Don’t mother and son involved in incest have a “personal bond”?
And isn’t the state entitled, in some cases, to
prohibit certain sexual activity just because most of us find it deplorable?
I, for one, would outlaw the viewing of child pornography by anyone, anywhere,
including in the privacy of his home. Further, I would outlaw it even if it
were entirely computer-generated (that is, no actual children were harmed by
its production) because I think the state has a right to enforce minimal
standards of decency in its citizenry.
The Supreme Court makes a very poor legislature. Its
broad pronouncements of new rights restrict our collective right to create
through democratic means the kind of society we prefer.
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